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ABSTRACT 
Despite the preparatory works carried out since 1978 towards the inlernalional negotiation ol' a 
Protocol on appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of liability and compensation 
for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area, 
the Ninth Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention (Barcelona, 
5-8 June 1995) discussed this subject again and invited the Secrelariat to convcnc a lírst Mcct ing
of government-designated legal and technical expe11s in arder to review a draft to be prepared by
the Secretariat, taking into account the work of other international bodies on the subject. This
first Meeting of Government-designated legal and technical experts was held at Rijeka, Croatia.
from 23 to 25 September 1997 and other Meetings are scheduled for the near füture. Therel'ore.
in this paper I will examine the contents already agreed on this tapie that are, at present, under
international negotiations, as well as the main problems on which consensus has not yet becn
possible.
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INTRODUCTION 
It must be remembered that the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
(Barcelona, 16 February 1976) (De Yturriaga Barberan, 1976; Kiss, 1977) included an Article 12, 
entitled "Liability and compensation", which needed to be implemented by the Contracting 
Parties. In arder to be accurate, it must be pointed out that the Mediterranean Coastal States ancl 
the European Community began very early to comply with the contents of this provision. The 
preparatory works for the formulation and adoption of appropriate legal procedures for the 
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from the pollution of the marine 
environment began in 1978. However, twenty years after the adoption of the 1976 Barcelona 
Convention, the contents of its Article 12 have not been implemented yet. 
Maybe this is the reason that explains why the Contracting Parties reacted to this situation cluring 
the revision process of the Barcelona system for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
pollution (Scovazzi, 1995; Bou, 1996; Juste 1995). Therefore, on the one hand, in 1995 the ole! 
1976 Barcelona Convention was amended, and nowadays it enjoys a new amended Articlc 1 (1, 
also entitled "Liability and Compensation", which reads as follows: "The Contracting Parties 
undertake to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules and procedures for 
the determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the marine 
environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area". 
On the other hand, during the Ninth Ordinary Meeting ofthe Contracting Parties to the Barcelona 
Convention (Barcelona, 5-8 June 1996), the subject of liability for damage to the Mediterranean 
environment was discussed again. The Contracting Parties decided to invite the Secretariat to 
convene a first meeting of government-designated legal and technical experts in order to review a 
draft to be prepared by the Secretariat of appropriate procedures for the determination of liability . 
and compensation for damage resulting from the pollution of the marine environment, in 
conformity with Article 16 of the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention and taking into account 
the works of other bodies on the subject. 
Pursuant to this decision, the Secretariat prepared a draft of appropriate rules and procedures for 
the determination of liability and compensation which, after being revie�ed and amended by a 
petit comité was submitted as a working document (UNEP(OCA)/MED WG.117/3) to the First 
Meeting of Legal and Technica\ Experts for the preparation of appropriate rules and procedures 
on liability and compensation for its thorough consideration. This First Meeting of Experts was 
held at Rijeka, Croatia, from 23 to 25 September 1997 and it concluded with an invitation to the 
Secretariat to draw up a draft Protocol on this subject, taking into account the conclusions of this 
First Meeting ofExperts (UNEP(OCA)/MED WG.117/CRP. l), and to submit it for consideration 
by a future Second Meeting ofLegal and Technical Experts. 
THE PREPARATORY WORKS OF THE FUTURE PROTOCOL 
Upon the preparatory works already carried out, it is possible to make different legal 
considerations concerning the future legal regime for the determination of liability and 
compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment in the 
Mediterranean Sea Area. 
The Legal Form Of The Instrument Concerning Environmental Liability In The 
Mediten·anean 
It must be highlighted that the First Meeting of Experts reached a general agreement of ali the 
Contracting Parties on the legal form of the future liability regime. It was agreed that the future 
regime on environmental liability will be embodied in a legal instrument which will enjoy a 
mandatory character and not an hortatory one. It means that in relation to the question of the 
form which a future Mediterranean liability regime might take, the general view among the 
experts was that a binding legal instrument was to be preferred to a soft law instrument. 
However, there were different opinions concerning the concrete legal form that will enjoy the 
future instrument on liability and compensation. On the one hand, the working document 
prepared by the Secretariat considered that it might be advisable that, in view of the nature ol' lhe 
rules and procedures for liability and compensation and their importance in the enforcement 
aspect of the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention, they could, like the arbitration procedure in 
relation to Article 18 of the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention, entitled "Settlement of 
Disputes", take the form of a new Annex B to the Barcelona Convention. The Secretarial's 
propasa! was based upon the idea that the simplest procedure for the Contracting Pai1ies would 
be to adopt an Annex to the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention, thereby avoiding the need for 
the lengthy ratification process required for a new Protocol to the Barcelona Convention. 
However, on the other hand, during the Meeting ofExperts the general view was that a Protocol 
to the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention was to be preferred to an Annex to the same 
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Barcelona Convention. This decision was agreed upon the consideration that in sorne instances 
the adoption of a liability and compensation Mediterranean regime would require amendments of 
the domestic legislation of the Contracting Parties, which could only be done if a ratification 
process involving national parliaments was followed. Therefore, the legal security afforded by the 
process for the entry into force of Protocols to the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention was 
preferred to the celerity that is reached with the process for the entry into force of an Annex to 
the same Convention. 
The Definition Of Damage 
The Meeting of Experts also made substantive progress towards the definition of damage that will 
be followed in the future Mediterranean regime on liability for damage to the environment. It 
expressed its preference for a broad definition of damage, encompassing not only the damage to 
persons and property, but also the damage caused by impairment of the marine and coastal 
environment of the Mediterranean, as well as the cost of preventive measures and further loss or 
damage caused by the preventive measures. A general agreement was reached on preventive 
measures, considering that: "Part of the definition of damage should also be the cost of preventive 
measures taken in order: ( 1) to preven! an impeding grave threat of causing damage; or (2) to 
avoid the aggravation of damage to human beings, to property and to the environment. These 
measures may be taken by any person and they must be reasonable. The measures to prevent or 
minimise damage are taken after the occurrence of the incident, that is, after any sudden 
occurrence, or continuous occurrence or any series of occurrences having the same origin ... The 
cost of preventive measures is one element of the definition of damage and they are compensated 
by the operator ( especially when the public authorities implement them and subsequently charge 
the operator), if only they are reasonable in view of the circumstances". The Meeting of Experts 
even discussed whether impairment of the marine environment also included the Mediterranean 
high seas, which might entail further consideration of how to identify the victim which may claim 
legal liability for damage. Finally, taking into account that both the 1995 amended Barcelona 
Convention and its related Protocols covered the whole of the Mediterranean, including the high 
seas, the Meeting expressed the general view that the Mediterranean liability regime should also 
cover the high seas and that the drafting of this regime should solve ali the technical legal 
problems arising from its application to the high seas. 
The Meeting of Experts also agreed on severa! questions related directly to the definition of 
damage, that are really impo1iant in order to concrete its future contents. Among them, the three 
following agreements must be highlighted. Firstly, the Meeting of Experts considered advisable 
that the future Mediterranean liability regime will cover both accidental and incidental pollution. 
Therefore, the Meeting of Experts accepted the proposal embodied in the Secretariat's working 
document, stating that: "the damage may result from three kinds of incidents: ( 1) from a sudden 
occurrence (fire, leak or emission); (2) from a continuous occurrence (discharging or releasing 
dangerous substances into the sea from land-based sources and activities); and (3) from a series 
of occurrences with the same origin (a series or explosions affecting successively the parts of an 
installation)". Secondly, regarding the persons to whom address an eventual application of 
liability for damage to the environment, the Meeting of Experts decided not to confine solely to 
the liability of the owner of the ship, as existing maritime conventions usually do, but considered 
that ali liability should accrue to the operator, which was defined as the person who is in control 
of a dangerous or potentially dangerous activity. This person must exercise effective control o ver 
the dangerous or potentially dangerous activity and have the power to decide upon the operation 
ofthat activity. Hence, employees are not considered as operators. 
Thirdly, an interesting discussion took place concerning the scope of the expression "dangerous 
or potentially dangerous activity". Some delegations considered the need to limit the scope of 
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dangerous activities to professional (in contradiction to domestíc) activities. lt was explained that 
the term "professional" was taken from the Council of Europe Convention on civil líabílity for 
damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment (Lugano, 21 June 1993) and was 
intended to cover industrial, commercial, agricultura! and scientific activities. In fact, the 
definition of "dangerous or potentially dangerous activities" encompasses ali professíonal 
activities whích involve dangerous substances and materials, non-indigenous or genetically 
modified species, and generally operations which are harmful to the biological diversity and 
specially protected areas, the remo val of offshore installations and operations concerning waste or 
discharging waste. Nonetheless, other national experts held a different opinion and they backed a 
wider definition that will not confine the scope of the expression "dangerous or potentially 
dangerous activities" only to professional activities. They pointed out that leisure activities, for 
instance, might also lead to marine pollution. Therefore, they suggested that the Mediterranean 
liabilíty regime should cover ali acts or activities causing pollution as it is defined in Article 2 (a) 
of the l 995 amended Barcelona Convention. Pursuant to this provision: "Pollution means the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, 
including estuaries, which results, or is likely to result, in such deleterious effects as harm to living 
resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including 
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of seawater and 
reduction of amenities". This would ensure, in their opinion, a more effective protection of 
Mediterranean biological diversity. 
However, thorough the deliberations of the Meeting of Experts it was evident that there was a 
majority view considering that the Mediterranean liability regime should be based on a limited 
definition of dangerous or potentially dangerous activities. In particular, it was suggested that it 
should be limited to dangerous or potentially dangerous activities specifically listed. Thís should 
not prejudice any obligation, arising from domestic legislation, to compensate for acts or activities 
which caused pollution, as defined in Article 2 (a) ofthe 1995 amended Barcelona Convention. 
Thus, the dangerous or potentially dangerous activities that will be of intemational relevance for 
the future Protocol on environmental liability in the Mediterrane,111 will be limited to those 
activities specifically Iisted, which by the moment cover the following professional activities: ( 1) 
the production, storage, use and discharge or release of dangerous substances and materials in the 
marine and coastal environment of the Mediterranean; (2) the introduction of non-indigenous or 
genetically modified species which may have harmful impacts on the ecosystems, habitats or 
species in the marine and coastal environment of the Mediterranean or pose significant risk for 
man and property; (3) the removal of abandoned or disused installations engaged in the 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil; ( 4) the 
discharge and disposal of wastes from the operation of offshore installations and the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and their disposal; (5) the operation of an 
installation or site for the incineration, treatment, handling or recycling of waste provided that the 
quantities involv�d pose a significant risk for man, property and the marine and coastal 
environment ofthe Mediterranean; (6) the operation ofa site for the permanent deposit ofwaste; 
(7) the operation of a site for the dumping of wastes or other matter; and (8) those activities or
acts which are likely to harm or disturb the species, that might endanger the state of conservatíon
ofthe ecosystems or species or might impair the natural or cultural characteristics ofthe specially
protected areas.
Scope And Exemptions Under· The Liability Regime 
The Meeting of Experts considered three different options when determining the legal kind of 
liability that will be provided for by the future Protocol. The fault-based liability was. rejected, as 
it requires the proof of fault that the conduct of the operator was intentionally or negligently in 
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violation of the law. Proof that, in sorne events, may be very difficult or even impossible to 
obtain. Unlike the fault-based liability, strict liability was preferred because it <loes not need the 
proof of fault, as it only requires that the damage was caused as a result of the conduct of the 
operator and that the damage is not permissible under the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention 
or the future liability regime. Moreover, strict liability also enjoys the additional advantage, unlike 
absolute liability, that it allows a narrowly defined range of exemptions. 
Therefore, at the Meeting of Experts there was a general consensus that the liability regime of the 
operator should be based on strict liability, thus endorsing the propasa! of the Secretariat's 
working document. The introduction of the standard of strict liability to the Barcelona system can 
be dcfined, firstly, ratione materiae, in respect of which activities the resulting damage may give 
rise to strict liability. Hence, strict liability may arise from damage resulting from the dangerous or 
potentially dangerous activities specifically listed. Secondly, the strict liability standard can be 
stated ratione temporis, taking into account the time at which the damage was caused or became 
known. Finally, the strict liability standard can be approached ratione personae, in respect of the 
operators who can be liable if an incident consists of either a continuous occurrence or of a series 
of occurrences having the same origin. 
This Meeting of Experts also discussed possible grounds for exempting the strict liability regirne 
for damage resulting frorn pollution of the marine environment in the Mediteffanean Sea Area. 
Exemptions should be determined on the basis of two criteria. First, that a Contracting Party 
should not be held liable for the acts or the events beyond its control. Second, that the 
exemptions should be defined as narrowly as possible so that the Contracting Parties would not 
take advantage of any !acuna in the liability regime for the Mediterranean. It was also taken into 
account that some exemptions already existed in different Protocols to the 1995 amended 
Barcelona Convention, such as Article 8 of the Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of 
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea, 
Article 18 of the Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean and Article 14 of the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed 
and its Subsoil. Pointing out that these grounds for exemptions operate at the international leve! 
and as such they would not prevent any claim for compensation under domestic laws, or recourse 
to the Mediterranean lnter-State Compensation Fund (MISC Fund), the following list of 
exemptions were proposed and discussed: (1) an act ofwar, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, an 
act of terrorism against which no reasonable precautionary measures could have been effective; 
(2) a natural phenomenon constituting in the circumstances of the Mediterranean a disaster of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character; (3) acts by a third Party with the intent to cause
damage, which is unassociated with the operator (violent acts by operator's employees are not
covered) provided that ali appropriate safety measures have been taken; ( 4) pollution at a
tolerable leve! in the light of local circumstances (in urban or rural zones); (5) compliance with ·
compulsory measures of a public authority; ar¡d (6) a dangerous activity taken lawfully in the
interests of the person suffering a damage (this ground covers in particular emergency cases or
cases where the dangerous activity was carried out with the real and unequivocal consent of the
person who has suffered a damage).
But severa! delegates expressed reservations concerning the grounds for exemption set fo11h in 
that List. Thus, for instance, sorne delegates held that an "act ofterrorism" could be deleted in the 
first exemption, as it could be regarded as being covered by the reference to "acts by a third 
party" included in the third exemption. Other expert held that the mention of "an act of terrorism" 
should be retained. The contents ofthe fifth exemption "compliance with compulsory measures of 
a public authority" should be clarified; another view expressed that the fourth exemption was not 
really an exemption. Therefore, the List containing the grounds for exemptions to strict civil 
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liability of the operator far damage to the environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area will be 
discussed again at the next Second Meeting ofExperts. 
The System For Liability And Compensation For Damage To The Envirnnment 
The system far liability that is being negotiated is the most original feature of the future 
Mediterranean liability regime and it is probably the subject where most different views and 
reservations were expressed during the First Meeting of Experts. The three-tiered proposed 
system far the Mediterranean liability regime combines the strict civil liability ofthe operators, the 
establishment of a Mediterranean lnter-State Compensation Funcl (MISC Fund) ancl the residual 
liability of States. 
The proposed liability system is built upan the "polluter pays principie", which is already incluclecl 
in Article 4 (3) (b) of the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention. Pursuant to this provision, by 
virtue of the polluter pays principie "the costs of pollution prevention, control and recluction 
measures are to be borne by the polluter, with due regard to the public interest". Hence, two 
hypotheses must be distinguished in applying the polluter pays principie at this initial stage of the 
cletermination of liability far damage to the Mecliterranean environment. On the one hand, it is 
evident that States will be held liable far damage resulting from activities dangerous to the marine 
and coastal environment of the Mediterranean where the State itself a State corporation or a 
State agent, cause such a damage. This is a clear case and creates no problem for the application 
ofthe polluter pays principie. 
However, on the other hand, the application of the polluter pays principie may practically beco me 
inefficient if such a damage is caused by private individuals or 11011-State agencies acting under t he 
jurisdiction and control of the State. For this case, it is scheduled, tirslly, a system of strict civil 
liability of the operator. But there may be cases where private operators cannot meet the foil cost 
of the reparations of the damage to the marine and coastal environment resulting from their 
dangerous or potentially dangerous activities. Although private operators can be farced to enjoy a 
private insurance, it must be taken into account that, in general, insurances impose limits on the 
extent of their liabilities and so it is possible that the extent of the compensation and reparation 
required from the damage may clearly exceed the limit imposed by the insurance. 
To face these problems, the First Meeting of Expe1is followed a three-tiered liability system that 
allows to cover ali the costs required from the damage to the Mediterranean environment. This 
system consists in establishing three consecutive and supplementary phases for liability for 
damages to the environment: strict civil liability of the operator, the establishment of' the 
Mediterranean Inter-State Compensation Fund (MISC Fund) and the implementation of a residual 
liability far the State. 
In regarcl of the regime of strict civil liability of the operator, a compulsory financia! and security 
scheme was scheclulecl, which will be implemented upon the faur following elements: ( 1) each 
Contracting Pa1iy, shoulcl, where appropriate, ensure uncler internal law that operators have 
financia! security to cover liability far damage uncler the 1995 amenclecl Barcelona Convention 
system; (2) in this context, each Contracting Party should determine the scope, the conditions ancl 
the form of the financia! security. In particular, each Contracting Party shall determine a certain 
limit to which this financia! security may be subject ancl which activities shoulcl be subject to the 
financia! security; (3) in arder to avoicl any failure to apply the financia! security requirement due 
to the impossibility to foresee the risk, a financia! guarantee should be established to cover such 
risk; and ( 4) a financia! security scheme or financia! guarantee can exist in man y different forms 
( e. g. an insurance contract or a financia! co-operation between operators). The most 
'tontroversial element ancl the one which will neecl further cliscussion in the future is the limit of' 
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the strict civil liability of the operators, as sorne experts found it very difficult, if not, irnpossible, 
to calculate and fix a unifonn ceiling for cornpulsory insurance in view of the diversity of the 
damages involved. Other delegates were in favour of establishing a uniform system bccausc 
excessive disparities between the interna! laws of the different Mediterranean States would distort 
competition and result in "dumping" phenomena. 
Secondly, there is a prediction to establish a Mediterranean lnter-Statc Compensation Fund 
(MISC Fund), although there still is a great deal of different views on it. Thus, for instance, the 
Secretariat and sorne national experts considered that the MISC Fund should be recognised by 
each Contracting Party as a legal person under its laws, capable of assuming rights and 
obligations and of being a party in legal proceedings befare its dornestic courts. Other experts 
suggested that the MISC Fund, rather than being a separate international body, could be 
adrninistered by bodies already existing within the Mediterranean Action Plan, such as the 
M�eting of the Contracting Parties or possibly the Bureau, which rneets relatively frequently. 
The establishment of a MISC Fund would fulfil two goals. On the one hand, the MISC Fund 
would supplernent the application of the polluter pays principie, that is, in cases where the private 
operator is not able to meet the entire cost of the required compensation and reparation for the 
darnage he has caused. It implies that the MISC Fund will be established for paying compensation 
but only to the extent that compensation for damage under the strict civil liability regime of the 
operator is inadequate ( e. g. · in cases where the extent of the compensation and reparation 
required from the damage exceeds the lirnit irnposed by the insurance) or not available (e. g. in 
cases of unknown polluters). On the other hand, the MISC Fund would also ensure a faster 
implementation of preventive rneasures in an emergency situation, that is, after the occurrence of 
the incident. In regard to this second objective, it is worth noting that the operation of the MISC 
Fund would assist public authorities to irnrnediately respond to emergency situations taking, 
should the operator default, reasonable preventive measures. 
More specifically, the MISC Fund might pay compensation to any person suffering damage if 
such person has been unable to receive full and adequate compensation for the damage under the 
strict civil liability regirne of the operator for the following four reasons: (!) when no liability for 
the damage arises under the strict civil liability regime of the operator; (2) when the cause of thc 
loss or damage is of an indeterminate character; (3) when the damage exceeds polluter's liability; 
and ( 4) when the polluter is financially incapable of meeting his obligations in full and the 
provided financia! security does not cover or is insufficient to satisfy the clairns for compensation 
for damage, provided that the person suffering the damage has been unable to obtain full 
satisfaction of his clairn after having taken ali reasonable steps to pursue the available legal 
remedies. There are two cases in which the operation of the MISC Fund will be exempted. 
Firstly, the operation of the MISC Fund should be exempted in cases where it is proved that the 
damage resulted frorn the operation of any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft 
owned or operated by a State and used at the time of the incident only on government non­
commercial service. Although it was not expressly stated, in these cases it must be understood 
that the international liability of the State concerned rnust be directly required. Secondly, the 
MISC Fund should be exonerated wholly or paiiially from the obligation to pay cornpensation if it 
proves that the damage resulted wholly or partially from an intentional or negligent act or 
omission done by the person who suffered the darnage. This is a particular application of the 
doctrine of "clean hands", according to which a claimant's involvernent in activity illegal under 
either municipal or international law may bar the claim. However, no such an exoneration may 
exist with regard to preventive measures. 
Moreover, there are two additional special cases in which the MISC Fund should also operate: 
( 1) in cases where the polluter, in arder to prevent or rninimise damage, makes reasonably and
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voluntarily expenses or sacrifices, which should be treated as damage; and (2) in emergency 
situations providing an immediate source of finance to reimburse the Contracting Parties which 
undertake immediate response actions to <leal with any damage and abate emergency. ln these 
two special cases, such an operation of the MISC Fund will be extremely useful and beneficia! 
because it would represent an important incentive for both the operator to be immediately 
involved to prevent or minimise the damage and for the Contracting Parties to undertake 
inunediate response actions avoiding lengthy litigations to recover the cost of their operations. In 
both special situations, the burden of proof should lie u pon the operator or upon the Contracting 
Party. The proof should be based on the information available at the time that irreversible damage 
would have resulted if the immediate response action were not undertaken and that the costs 
associated with the emergency actions were reasonable and necessa1y. 
It is also importartt to highlight that, although it was not negotiated in detail, discussions bcgan in 
this very First Meeting of Experts on the sources of finance of the MISC Fund. Although it was 
agreed that further consideration had to be given to this issue befare deciding upon any 
recommendations concerning the MISC Puml, ditl'erenl views were alsu expressed in rela1ion lo 
its financing. In particular, some experts considered that its financing should come from 
contributions of the Contracting Parties, possibly based on a percentage of their contributions to 
the Mediterranean Trust Fund. Other delegates held the view that its financing should be made up 
of contributions from prívate operators. The First Meeting ofExperts could ndt even agree on the 
limits ofthe compensation that the MISC Fund would have to pay in a particular situation. 
Thirdly and last but not least, the Meeting of Experts considered the establishment of residual 
State liability. On this topic, the opinions of the national experts were even more divergent, 
despite that the residual State liability implies that a Contracting Party may be held liable for 
damage caused to persons, property and the marine and coastal environment of the 
Mediterranean, and provide for compensation only to the extent that the compensation for 
damage under the strict civil liability regime of the operator and under the MISC Fund, is 
inadequate. Some national experts pointed out that it would represent a depa1iure from the 
ordinary liability system according to which the liability of prívate operators could not be replaced 
by State liability. Other national experts held that the primary obligation of a State was to control 
and prevent pollution and its liability could only arise if control and prevention measures had 
failed. In this connection, it was emphasised that a State was ultimately responsible for events 
occurring within its own jurisdiction and that residual State liability would enhance the 
effectiveness and credibility of the 1995 amended Barcelona Convention system. One question 
particularly raised whether the residual liability of States would no longer apply if they 
contributed to the MISC Fund. After these considerations, the First Meeting ofExperts could not 
reach any substantive agreement on this tapie and, at the end of the discussion, some experts 
supported the introduction of residual State liability, whereas others expressed reservations on it. 
Consequently, it was agreed that further reflection was required on this subject by the future 
Second Meeting of Experts. 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Mediterranean Coastal States and the European Community have been negotiating during 
nearly twenty years a Protocol on liability for damage resulting from pollution of the marine 
enviroµment in the Mediterranean Sea Area without any success. Nowadays, it seems that once 
the revision process of the Barcelona system for the protection of the Mediterranean has been 
concluded, they have made for the first time substantive progress towards the adoption of a 
future Protocol on this subject, 
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This new ecological ímpetus ofthe Mediterranean Coastal States and the European Community is 
being ve1y broadly defined. The decisions that the future liability Protocol will establish a broad 
definition of damage, covering both accidental and incidental pollution, the reception of the 
definition of operator, that substantive progress had been reached towards the elaboration of a 
List of <langerous or potentially dangerous activities, the preference for a strict liability system, 
the development of a three-tiered system of liability which combines the strict civil liability of 
operators, the establishment of a MISC Fund and the residual liability of States, are ali of them 
good expressions of the will that the future Protocol will be able to face ali the liabilities and 
compensations for all the damages resulting from pollution of the Mediterranean environment. 
Therefore, we must express our wish of success for the immediate conclusion of this international 
negotiation. 
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